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1. Provo City Corporation, plaintiff/appellant. 
2. Christensen & Griffith Construction Company, 
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3. State of Utah, by and through its Department of 
Transportation, defendant/respondent. 
4. Staker Paving & Construction Company, 
defendant/appellant. 
5. Gallegos Construction Company, third-party defendant 
6. Hickiau Construction Company, third-party defendant. 
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4. STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION AND 
DESCRIBING NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (Repl. 1987) and Rule 54(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
This appeal is from a final judgment of the Fourth District 
Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah. Plaintiffs sued 
defendants for alleged damage arising out of defendant State of 
Utah's diking project along Interstate 15 on the south side of 
Provo City in 1984. Defendant Staker Paving & Construction 
Company was the State of Utah's contractor for the diking 
project. The State of Utah moved for summary judgment as to 
plaintiff's claims and Staker's cross-claims on the theory that 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (Repl. 1986) provides absolute immunity 
herein. The trial judge granted the State of Utah's motion, 
then certified the Order granting the State of Utah summary 
judgment as a "final" Order pursuant to Rule 54(b). 
5. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
The issue presented for review is whether Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-3 (Repl. 1986) provides the State of Utah absolute 
immunity from its contractor's cross-claims of indemnity and 
contribution, even though Staker performed the work pursuant to 
the State's plans and specifications and under the daily 
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supervision and control of the State, and even though the State 
inspected, approved, and accepted Staker's work. 
6. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (Repl. 1986). Immunity of 
governmental entities from suit. 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this 
chapter, all governmental entities are immune from 
suit for any injury which results from the exercise of 
a governmental function, governmentally-owned 
hospital, nursing home, or other governmental health 
care facility, and from an approved medical, nursing, 
or other professional health care clinical training 
program conducted in either public or private 
facilities. 
The management of flood waters and other natural 
disasters and the construction, repair, and operation 
of flood and storm systems by governmental entities 
are considered to be governmental functions, and 
governmental entities and their officers and employees 
are immune from suit for any injury or damage result-
ing from those activities. 
7. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case: Plaintiff Provo City owns land 
adjacent to Interstate 15 on the south side of Provo. Plain-
tiff Christensen & Griffith Construction Company was Provo's 
contractor for a golf course being constructed on Provo City's 
land. In 1984 the State of Utah did a diking project along 
1-15 on the south side of Provo. Defendant Staker Paving & 
Construction Company was the State's contractor for the 
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diking project. Plaintiffs allege the diking project caused 
them damage. 
B. Course of the Proceedings: The State of Utah moved 
for summary judgment on governmental immunity grounds. The 
motion was granted as to plaintiffs' claims and Staker's 
cross-claims. The Order was certified as a "final" Order 
pursuant to Rule 54(b). A timely appeal was perfected by 
plaintiffs and by Staker. 
C. Disposition at Trial Court: The trial judge granted 
the State of Utah summary judgment and certified the Order as a 
"final" Order pursuant to Rule 54(b). 
D. Relevant Facts with Citations to Record: 
1. John D. Keyes was the project engineer for the Utah 
Lake Dike Project, the diking of 1-15 just on the south side of 
Provo City. (Record, 484, Deposition of John D. Keyes, pp. 3-5. 
Hereinafter, references to Keyes' deposition will simply be to 
the particular page of Keyes' deposition, which is in the Record 
on appeal at page 484.) 
2. The plans, specifications and design of the Utah Lake 
Dike Project were put together by the State of Utah. (Keyes, 
p. 55.) 
3. It was not part of Staker's contract to do anything 
about the condition of the pre-existing culverts. (Keyes, 
p. 68.) 
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4. There was pre-existing sediment in the culverts. 
(Keyes, pp. 69-71.) 
5. Staker's work had to be inspected by the State of Utah 
and had to pass inspection. (Keyes, pp. 73-74.) 
6. On July 3rd, 1984, the State of Utah did conduct a 
final inspection of Staker's work on the Utah Lake Dike 
Project. A few minor deficiencies were noted with respect to 
pavement patching along the shoulder, placement of reflectors, 
etc., but none of the items noted on the final inspection had 
anything to do with the extension of the culverts. (Keyes, 
pp. 75-76.) 
7. On May 13, 1985, Provo City and Christensen & Griffith 
Construction Company sued the State of Utah and Staker Paving 
and Construction Company for alleged property damage associated 
with the dike work. (Record, 1.) 
8. On July 15, 1985, Staker Paving and Construction 
Company cross-claimed as against the State of Utah for indemni-
fication and contribution. (Record, 22.) 
9. On September 21, 1987, the State of Utah moved for 
summary judgment against plaintiffs' claims and Staker's 
cross-claims. (Record, 180.) 
10. On December 2, 1987, the trial court granted the 
State's motion as against the plaintiffs' claims. (Record, 
360). 
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11. On January 4, 1987, the trial court granted the 
State's motion as against Staker's cross-claims. (Record, 410, 
415.) 
12. On February 8, 1988, the trial court certified its 
Order granting the State of Utah's Motion for Summary Judgment 
as a final appealable Order. (Record, 415, 432.) 
8. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT1 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 does not provide the State of Utah 
immunity from Staker's contribution and indemnification claims 
over against the State of Utah. It has always been the law of 
the State of Utah that equitable claims are not subject to 
governmental immunity. In this case, Staker Paving & 
Construction Company performed pursuant to plans, specifica-
tions, and designs provided by the State of Utah. The State of 
Utah had a Project Engineer who was daily on the work site and 
1The position of Staker Paving & Construction Company is that 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 provides both the State of Utah and 
Staker Paving & Construction Company, as an employee of the 
State of Utah, absolute immunity from plaintiff's claims 
herein. The lower court has ruled that § 63-30-3 does provide 
the State of Utah absolute immunity. Whether this ruling of 
the lower court is correct will be fully briefed by the other 
parties to this consolidated appeal, and if this Court decides 
that § 63-30-3 does not provide the State absolute immunity, 
the decision would apply likewise to the State's summary 
judgment as to Staker's cross-claim. 
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directed and supervised the work of Staker. At the conclusion 
of Staker's work, the State of Utah performed a final inspection 
of Staker's work, and Staker's work met the plans, specifica-
tions, and designs of the State of Utah in all material respects 
herein. On these facts, it would be inequitable for the State 
of Utah to be immune from Staker's contribution and indemnifica-
tion claims over against the State of Utah. 
9. ARGUMENT 
In El Rancho Enters, Inc. v. Murray City Corp., 565 P.2d 
778 (Utah 1977) the Court noted that "the common law exception 
to governmental immunity pertaining to equitable claims has 
long been recognized in this jurisdiction." _Id. at 779. The 
El Rancho Court discussed Utah Supreme Court cases dating back 
to the year 1901 which have so held. In Bowles v. State, 652 
P.2d 1345, 1346 (Utah 1982) the Court again held that govern-
mental immunity is not a defense to equitable claims. 
Contribution is an equitable claim. 
The Doctrine is not founded on, nor does it arise 
from, contract, but is founded on principles of equity 
and natural justice and comes from the application of 
principles of equity to the condition in which the 
parties are found in consequence of some of them, as 
between themselves, having done more than their share 
in performing a common obligation. 
18 C.J.S. Contribution § 2, p. 3 (1939) (footnote omitted). 
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Indemnity is likewise an equitable claim. The Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 886B (1979) recognizes that "the basis for 
indemnity is restitution, and the concept that one person is 
unjustly enriched at the expense of another when the other 
discharges liability that it should be his responsibility to 
pay." Id. § 886B, Comment c. Comment c goes on to explain 
that n[t]he unexpressed premise has been that indemnity should 
be granted in any factual situation in which, as between the 
parties themselves, it is just and fair that the indemnitor 
should bear the total responsibility . . . ." 
Staker Paving & Construction Company's claims against the 
State of Utah are for contribution and/or indemnification on 
the theory that Staker's conduct was pursuant to the plans, 
specifications and designs of the State of Utah, the State of 
Utah directed and controlled Staker's work, and the State of 
Utah inspected, approved and accepted Staker's work. If Staker 
has any liability to plaintiffs, Staker should, in equity and 
good conscience, be entitled to contribution and/or indemnifica-
tion from the State of Utah. The trial judge erred in granting 
the State of Utah summary judgment as to the claims for contri-
bution and/or indemnification of Staker Paving & Construction 
Company. 
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CONCLUSION 
Governmental immunity does not apply to equitable claims. 
The claims of Staker Paving & Construction Company against the 
State of Utah are equitable claims. The trial judge erred in 
granting the State of Utah summary judgment as to the claims of 
Staker Paving & Construction Company. 
STATEMENT OF PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
The precise relief sought by Staker Paving & Construction 
Company is that the Order granting the State of Utah Summary 
Judgment against Staker be set aside and that the claims of 
Staker against the State of Utah proceed to a jury trial. 
DATED this 28th day of April, 1988. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Robert H. Henderson 
Attorneys for Staker Paving & 
Construction Company 
SCMRHH206 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
CARMAN E. KIPP 
ROBERT H. REES 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS row S t a t e o r Utah  r  
CITY C I N T H C I . #330 
f7S CAST * 0 0 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 64111-2314 
(SOI) S 2 I 3 7 7 3 
FILED. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION, a 
municipal corporation of the 
State of Utah and Christensen 
& Griffith Construction 
Company, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, by and 
through its Department of 
Transportation and Staker 
Paving and Construction 
Company, 
Defendants, 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 
STATE OF UTAH'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 69608 
On September 22, 1987, defendant State of Utah filed a 
motion for summary judgment against plaintiffs on their com-
plaint and against defendant Staker Paving and Construction 
Company on its cross-claim. On or about October 19, 1987, 
defendant Staker Paving and Construction Company filed a motion 
for summary judgment against plaintiffs. Plaintiff Provo City 
Corporation responded to defendant State of Utah's motion on 
October 16, 1987, and Plaintiff Christensen & Griffith Construc-
tion Company responded on November 2, 1987. Defendant State of 
Utah filed, on October 27, 1987, a reply memorandum addressing 
plaintiff Provo Cityfs memorandum and an additional reply memo-
randum filed on November 18, 1987, addressing plaintiff Chris-
tensen 4 Griffith Construction Companyfs memorandum. Having 
read all five memoranda, and having researched the applicable 
law, and for the reasons set forth in the court's two memorandum 
decisions dated December 2, 1987 and January 4, 1988, the court 
being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing 
hereby orders, adjudges, and decrees as follows: 
1. Under §63-30-3, U.C.A. (1953 as amended), defen-
dant State of Utah is entitled to immunity from the claims as-
serted against it in this case. 
2. Defendant State of Utah's motion for summary judg-
ment is hereby granted in total, and plaintiffs' complaint is 
hereby dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits, and the 
cross-claim of Staker Paving and Construction Company is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits. 
3. Because there remains a question of fact as tc 
whether or not defendant Staker Paving and Construction Company 
D CHRISTIAN PC 
'iNCVS AT LAW 
tWTWC I, #300 
imr 4QO S O U T H 
acted only as directed by the State of Utah, defendant Staker 
Paving and Construction Company's motion for summary judgment is 
hereby denied. 
DATED t h i s / & d a y of January, 1988. 
Approved as to form: 
", Attorney BMJCE RICHARDS, 
for Chr i s t ensen & G r i f f i t h 
Cons t ruc t ion Company 
GARY GRTCERSONy^ttorney 
for Prcwo Ci^yjCorporat ion 
mfrnif? 
HENDERSON, Attorney
 nAT| w UT^ f a 
for Staker Paving and BOUNTY OP UTAH 
Construction Company 
! 
I THE UNDERSIGN©, CLRR OP TWS OWtJCT R H I B 
5fs UTAH COUNTY, UTAH, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THf 
tfJNSXED ANO FOREGOING IS A TRUE AND FULL COPY O* 
H ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON RLE IN MY OFFICE AS SUCH 
WITNESS MY HAND^ 
DAY Of 
LUAXTT^HUISK CL£ 
U  JKND SEAL OF SAID C O U R f > f y 
^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
MAILED, postage prepaid, this ^r/i- day o f January, 
1988, true and correct copies of the foregoing Order Granting 
Defendant State of Utahfs Motion for Summary Judgment, to the 
following: 
Gallegos Construction Company 
P.O. Box 14547 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118-0547 
Kevin P. McBride 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Third-Party 
Defendant Hikiau Construction 
Sixth Floor - Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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.-DIPUTv 
EXHIBIT "B' 
GARY L. GREGERSON (#1254) 
At torney for P l a i n t i f f Provo C i ty 
P.O. Box 1849 
Provo , Utah 84603 
(801) 379-6149 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION, 
a municipal corporation 
of the State of Utah and 
CHRISTENSEN & GRIFFITH 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, by and 
through its Department 
of Transportaion, and 
STAKER PAVING AND 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Third-party 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GALLEGOS CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY AND HIKIAU 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Third-party 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 69608 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
CERTIFICATION OF ORDER 
GRANTING STATE OF UTAH'S 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION AS 
A FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER 
Pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Order dated and entered January 15, 1988 
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granting the State of Utah's SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION and 
dismissing State of Utah as a party defendant in the 
above-captioned matter is hereby certified as a final 
appealable order as provided for in Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure against defendant State of Utah only. 
There is no just reason for delay of the appeal notwithstanding 
the existence of claims remaining against defendant Staker 
Paving. 
DATED th is £ ^ day of -tTjKr , 1988 
CERTIFICATE OFNUAILING 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Certification of Order 
Granting State of Utah's Summary Judgment Motion as a Final 
Appealable Order to Gallegos Construction Company, P.O. Box 
14547, Salt Lake City, Utah 84118-0547; to Carmen K. Kipp, 175 
East 400 South, #330, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; to Robert H. 
Henderson, P.O. Box 45000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-4500; to 
Bruce L. Richards, P.O. Box 26786, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84126-0786 and to Kevin P. McBride, Sixth Floor Boston 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage prepaid, 
this £t,<tfU day oif)/^^^ 1988. 
GARY L. 
TabC 
EXHIBIT MC" 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
a****************** 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION, a 
municipal corporation of the 
State of Utah and CHRISTENSEN 
& GRIFFITH CONSTRUCTION CO., 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
its Department of Transporta-
tion, and STAKER PAVING AND 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
-vs-
GALLEGOS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
and HIKIAU CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
• • • * * * • • * * 
On September 22, 1987, the defendant filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment to which plaintiff, Provo City, responded on 
October 16, 1987, and plaintiff, Christensen and Griffith 
Construction responded on November 2, 1987. The defendant then 
filed on October 27, 1987, a reply memorandum addressing 
plaintiff Provo City's memorandum and an additional reply 
memorandum filed on November 18, 1987, addressing plaintiff 
Christensen and Griffith Construction's memorandum. Having read 
all five memoranda and having researched the applicable law, the 
Court finds that under section 63-30-3, UCA, as amended 1953, the 
State of Utah is entitled to immunity and therefore grants the 
Motion. 
CASE NUMBER 69,608 
RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Section 63-30-3, UCA, second paragraph, states: 
The management of flood waters and other 
natural disasters and the construction, 
repair, and operation of flood and storm 
systems by governmental entities are 
considered to be governmental functions, and 
governmental entities and their officers and 
employees are immune from suit for any injury 
or damage resulting from those activities. 
The plain meaning of this statute indicates that the 
State of Utah is immune from suit for any injury or damage 
resulting from the construction, repair, and operation of flood 
control systems whether such systems contain flood waters are 
not. Immunity is therefore granted whether damage is caused from 
the release of flood waters or from the impoundment of flood 
waters behind a flood control dam. Furthermore that immunity 
applies even if damages occur because of water buildup behind 
cofferdams, causing flooding, and even if it is alleged that the 
structure's actual purpose is for collateral benefits besides 
flood control. [See, Portis v. Folk Construction Co., 694 F. 2d 
520 (Eighth Cir. 1982), Pierce v. United States, 650 F. 2d 202 
(Ninth Cir. 1981). Although these cases interpreted a federal 
immunity statute, the Court found their reasoning persuasive in 
making its decision.] 
After considering all affidavits filed in this action 
and after taking judicial notice of flood conditions that were 
generally known within this Court's territorial jurisdiction 
during the year in question, this Court finds (as found in 
Portis, supra 522 on summary judgment), that there can be no 
serious question but that the actions taken by the State of Utah 
were part of a flood control project. The Court therefore finds 
that any damages caused by those actions are immune from suit. 
Some argument was made claiming that sections 63-30-8 
and 63-30-9, UCA as amended, take precedence to waive any 
immunity granted in section 63-30-3. However, it must be noted 
that 63-30-3 was enacted subsequent to these latter sections and 
the rule of interpretation is that later enactments take 
precedent over prior enactments insofar as the two are plainly 
inconsistent. See, Pride Club v. Miller, 572 P.2d 385 (Utah 
1977). Applying this rule, the Court finds that sections 63-30-
8, and 63-30-9 have no application to the specific situations 
delineated in section 63-30-3. 
The plaintiffs also argued that there is an issue as to 
applicability of section 63-30-3 to the present case. The cause 
of action in this case, whether in tort or in contract, did not 
arise until damages were sustained. The statute's effective date 
was March 29, 1984 and there is no question that the damages 
giving rise to this action occurred thereafter. Consequently, 
section 63-30-3 applies to this action and the suit against the 
State of Utah is barred. 
Counsel for defendant, State of Utah, to prepare an 
order incorporating the terms of this decision and submit it to 
opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to filing with the 
Court for signature. 
Dated this 2nd day of December, 1987. 
BY jpfLTOURT: 
R^f\M. HARDING, 5JJEGE 
cc: Bruce L. Richards, Esq. \ 
Gary L. Gregerson, Esq. 
Robert H. Henderson, Esq. 
Kevin P. McBride, Esq. 
Carman E. Kipp, Esq./Robert H. Rees, Esq. 
TabD 
EXHIBIT "D" 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
******************* 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION, a 
municipal corporation of the 
State of Utah and CHRISTENSEN 
& GRIFFITH CONSTRUCTION CO., 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
its Department of Transporta-
tion, and STAKER PAVING AND 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
-vs-
GALLEGOS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
and HIKIAU CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
********************* 
The Court has received several letters concerning its 
Memoradum Decision filed on December 2, 1987, and in response 
thereto now grants the State of Utah's Motion For Summary 
Judgment in total and dismisses Staker Paving's Cross-Claim 
against the State of Utah. The Court also notes that Staker 
Paving's Motion For Summary Judgment has been submitted for 
determination and herein denies the Motion. 
CASE NUMBER 69,608 
RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Section 63-30-3, UCA, second paragraph, states: 
The management of flood waters and other 
natural disasters and the construction, 
repair, and operation of flood and storm 
systems by governmental entities are 
considered to be governmental functions, and 
governmental entities and their officers and 
employees are immune from suit for any injury 
or damage resulting from those activities. 
Unlike this section's first paragraph, this second 
paragraph grants to governmental entities and their employees 
immunity from suit for any injury or damage resulting from the 
construction, repair, and operation of flood control systems. In 
order for Staker Paving to be immune from liability, it must be 
considered an "employee" under section 63-30-3's, UCA, second 
paragraph. 
Section 63-30-2(4), UCA, defines employee as: "any 
officer, employee, or servant of a governmental entity. . . ." 
The bulk of case authority describes a servant as someone or some 
entity under the physical direction or control of the employer. 
38A Words and Phrases 462 (1967). While the State did not 
ostensibly have power to control Staker Paving's day to day 
operations and may therefore be classified as an independant 
contractor, the Court is persuaded that so long as Staker Paving 
followed the State's specifications then it was a servant or 
employee under the statute. [This comports with the analysis in 
Portis v. Folk Construction Co., 694 F. 2d 520 (Eighth Cir. 
1982), Pierce v. United States, 650 F. 2d 202 (Ninth Cir. 1981).] 
However, any deviation contrary to the State's directions would 
expose them to liability for damages to third persons. 
Consequently, it is an issue of fact whether or not Staker Paving 
has acted only as directed by the State. Staker's Motion is 
therefore denied. 
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the State as 
master is only derivatively liable for acts within the course of 
a servant's employment and within the scope of the servant's 
authority. Consequently, since State of Utahis immune for any 
such acts, Staker Paving's Cross-Claim is dismissed. 
Counsel for defendant, State of Utah, to prepare an 
order incorporating the terms of this decision and submit it to 
opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to filing with the 
Court for signature. 
Dated this 4th day of January, 1988. 
BY^PflE^COURT: 
RX*5M. HARDING, J U D S ^ 
cc: Bruce L. Richards, Esq. \ 
Gary L. Gregerson, Esq. ^ 
Robert H. Henderson, Esq. 
Kevin P. McBride, Esq. 
Carman E. Kipp, Esq./Robert H. Rees, Esq. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Defendant/Appellant to the following on the 28th day of April, 
1988. 
Bruce L. Richards 
Bruce L. Richards & Associates 
Attorneys for Christensen & 
Griffith Construction 
P. O. Box 26786 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84126-0786 
Kevin P. McBride 
Strong & Hanni 
Attorneys for Hikiau Construction 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Gary Gregerson 
Attorney for Provo City 
359 West Center 
P. 0. Box 1849 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Carman E. Kipp 
Robert H. Rees 
Kipp and Christian, P.C. 
Attorneys for State of 
Utah and DOT 
175 East 400 South, #330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
Gallegos Construction Company 
P. O. Box 14547 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118-0547 
Robert H. Henderson 
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